Vouchers for Sectarian Schools after Zelman:
Will the First Circuit Expose Anti-Catholic Bigotry in the
Massachusetts Constitution?
By Richard Fossey and Robert LeBlanc
Introduction: School Voucher Litigation in the Wake of Zelman
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 1 decided in June 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that an Ohio voucher program for Cleveland school children is constitutional and
does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had struck down the program on Establishment
Clause grounds,2 and upheld the Cleveland voucher program by a 5 to 4 vote.
Most of public education’s prominent professional groups have consistently
opposed voucher programs that allow public money to pay for education in sectarian
schools. The National School Board Association, joined by several other professional
groups, filed an amici curiea brief in Zelman, arguing that the Cleveland voucher
program is unconstitutional.3 Within days after the Supreme Court released its decision
upholding the Cleveland program, many of public education’s advocacy groups issued
press releases expressing disappointment in Zelman’s outcome.4
Although Zelman settled federal constitutional questions about vouchers, voucher
opponents continued fighting in the courts.5 Most of this post-Zelman litigation involved
arguments about the legality of various state constitutional or statutory bans against
public aid for sectarian education.6
A substantial body of scholarship has shown that some of the state statutes and
constitutional bans against funding for sectarian education have their roots in 19th century

religious prejudice. In particular, so-called “Blaine Amendments,” 19th century state
constitutional provisions that prohibit public monies from aiding sectarian schools, are
steeped in a heritage of anti-Catholic bigotry.7
This article is in four parts. First, it describes the Supreme Court’s Zelman
decision, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher
program against an Establishment Clause challenge, thus dismantling a major
constitutional roadblock to public assistance for families sending their children to
sectarian schools.
Second, the article summarizes the scholarship about the Blaine Amendments,
which loom now as a major legal obstacle in many states to the implementation of
voucher programs that include religious schools. This scholarship shows that the Blaine
Amendments are—to say the least—cultural artifacts of 19th century anti-Catholic
bigotry.
Third, the article briefly reviews two post-Zelman court cases involving so-called
“Blaine Amendments”: Bush v. Holmes8 and Locke v. Davey.9 In the first case, a Florida
appellate court struck down Florida’s voucher program as being a violation of Florida’s
Blaine Amendment. In the second case, the Supreme Court declined to invalidate a
Washington constitutional provision that banned the use of public money for sectarian
education. Although commentators had labeled the Washington provision a Blaine
Amendment,10 the Supreme Court determined it was not, saying no evidence had been
produced that indicated Washington’s constitutional provision had been instituted out of
anti-religious prejudice.
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Finally, this article exams the case of Wirzburger v. Galvin,11 in which the First
Circuit Court of Appeals is currently considering the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
constitutional provision that bars Bay State citizens from using the state’s voter initiative
process to amend or repeal a 19th century constitutional ban against public funding for
sectarian schools. Indisputable scholarship shows that the Massachusetts legislature
approved this constitutional ban against public funding for sectarian schools at a time
when it was overwhelmingly dominated by the anti-Catholic Know-Nothing Party.12
Wirzburger provides the First Circuit (and ultimately perhaps the Supreme Court)
an opportunity to weaken a state constitutional provision that was borne of religious
intolerance and that wholly nullifies Zelman’s significance in the State of Massachusetts.
This article argues that the First Circuit should reverse the federal district court’s decision
and allow Massachusetts voters the opportunity to amend or repeal their state’s bigoted
constitutional bar against public aid for sectarian schools.
Zelman: The Supreme Court Upholds the Cleveland Voucher Program
In 1995, the Ohio legislature created the Cleveland voucher program in response
to the deplorable conditions in the Cleveland public schools. This program offered
vouchers to the parents of children in Cleveland’s public school system, which they could
use to attend private schools—either secular or religious.13 Under the program, children
could also use their vouchers to attend nearby public school systems; but, as of 2000, no
public system had agreed to participate in the program. 14
In 1999, about 3,700 of Cleveland’s 75,000 students participated in this voucher
program.15 Most children were from minority and low-income families, and sixty percent
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came from families living below poverty level. Ninety-six percent of the recipients
enrolled in religious schools, many of them Catholic.16
In 1996, voucher opponents filed suit in an Ohio state court, claiming the voucher
program violated both state law and the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
In 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the constitutional claim, but it did conclude
that the Ohio legislature had committed a technical violation by approving the program in
legislation primarily devoted to another topic.17 The legislature remedied this procedural
flaw, and the program continued to operate basically in its original form.18
After losing in the state courts, voucher opponents sued again in federal court,
repeating their claim that the Cleveland voucher program violated the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it allowed public funds to go to religious schools.
A federal trial court agreed and enjoined the program.19
Ohio education officials appealed to the Sixth Circuit; but in December 2000, a
three-judge panel upheld the trial court’s ruling.20 The Sixth Circuit panel concluded that
the voucher program had the “primary effect” 21 of advancing religion and therefore
violated the Establishment Clause. 22
In a remarkably bitter dissent, Sixth Circuit Judge Ryan accused the court
majority of “nativist hostility” 23 to religious schools. In striking down the voucher
program, Judge Ryan said, the majority had sentenced “nearly 4,000 poverty-level,
mostly minority children in Cleveland to return to the indisputably failed Cleveland
public schools.”24
Ohio education officials appealed the Sixth Circuit opinion, and the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case in 2001. The Court heard oral arguments on February 20,
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2002. On June 27, 2002, the Supreme Court issued its decision; by a 5 to 4 vote, it
reversed the Sixth Circuit,25 finding no constitutional infirmity in the Cleveland voucher
program.
The Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the voucher program
impermissibly aided religious schools. On the contrary, the Court wrote, the Cleveland
program was “entirely neutral with respect to religion.”26 The program provided
vouchers to “a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and
residence in a particular school district.”27 Cleveland families are permitted to “exercise
genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious.”28 Therefore, the
program was one of “true private choice.”29 As such, Justice Rehnquist concluded, the
Cleveland voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Although the Zelman decision was decided on constitutional grounds, the Court
took note of the desperate condition of the Cleveland public schools. “For more than a
generation,” the Court wrote, “Cleveland’s pubic schools have been among the worst
performing public schools in the nation.”30 Rehnquist noted that a federal district court
had declared a “crisis of magnitude” and placed the school system under state control in
1995:
Shortly thereafter, the state auditor found that Cleveland’s public schools
were in the mist of a “crisis that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of
American education.” The district has failed to meet any of the 18 state
standards for minimal acceptable performance. Only 1 in 10 ninth graders
could pass a basic proficiency examination, and students at all levels
performed at a dismal rate compared with students in other Ohio public
schools. More than two-thirds of high school students either dropped or
failed out before graduation. Of those students who managed to reach
their senior year, one of every four still failed to graduate. Of those
students who did graduate, few could read, write, or compute at levels
comparable to their counterparts in other cities.31
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Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion and submitted a concurring
opinion as well. Thomas emphasized the value of the Cleveland voucher program as a
means of giving poor urban families an alternative to Cleveland’s failing public
schools.32

Quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,33

Thomas wrote, “[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”34 Nevertheless, he pointed out, “the
promise of public education has failed poor inner-city blacks.”35
Justice Thomas rejected the argument that vouchers undermine the democratic
ideal of common public schools, stating:
While the romanticized ideal of universal public education resonates with
the cognoscenti who oppose vouchers, poor urban families just want the
best education for their children, who will certainly need it to function in
our high-tech and advanced society. As Thomas Sowell noted 30 years
ago: “Most black people have faced too many grim, concrete problems to
be romantics. They want and need certain tangible results, which can be
achieved only by developing certain specific abilities.” The same is true
today.36
School choice programs that involve religious schools, Thomas argued, only
appear unconstitutional to those who distort constitutional values in a way that disserves
those Americans who are in greatest need.37 Thomas concluded his concurring opinion
by quoting Fredrick Douglas: “[N]o greater benefit can be bestowed upon a long
benighted people, than giving to them, as we are here earnestly this day endeavoring to
do, the means of an education.”38
Zelman’s Aftermath: Voucher Opponents Vow to Keep Fighting in the Courts
Virtually all of the professional organizations that represent public education’s
major constituencies had taken the position that the Supreme Court should affirm the
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Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Zelman and declare the Cleveland voucher program
unconstitutional.39 The National School Board Association clearly expressed this view in
an amici curiae brief that was filed with the Court in the Zelman case.40 Several
education organizations joined NSBA in its brief: the National Parent Teachers
Association, the American Association of School Administrators, the National
Association of Secondary School Principals, the National Association of Elementary
School Principals, the American Association of University Women, the National
Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Association of Federally
Impacted Schools, and the National Association of Bilingual Education.41
When the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and upheld the Cleveland voucher
program, most of public education’s various interest groups wasted no time in criticizing
the Zelman decision. Within a few days after the Supreme Court ruled, the following
organizations issued press releases expressing disappointment with Zelman: the National
Association of Elementary School Principals,42 the National Parent Teachers
Association,43 the National School Boards Association,44 the National Association of
State Boards of Education,45 the National Association of Secondary School Principals,46
and the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.47
In fact, some groups not only expressed disappointment with Zelman, they
pledged to continue fighting vouchers both politically and in the courts. In particular, the
nation’s two largest teachers’ unions vowed to oppose voucher programs by every means
available to them. Bob Chase, president of the National Education Association, the
nation’s largest teachers’ union, issued a press release saying NEA would continue to
fight vouchers for private and religious schools “at the ballot box, in state legislatures,
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and in state courts.”48 (According to the Wall Street Journal, NEA had previously raised
its membership dues for the specific purpose of fighting voucher proposals.49) Sandra
Feldman, president of the American Federation of Teachers, issued a press release
echoing the same sentiment. Feldman said that AFT would fight any future efforts to
enact voucher legislation in the United States. 50
In addition to the unions, public education’s administrators and school board
groups vowed to continue fighting school vouchers. The executive director of the
American Association of School Administrators, a national group that represents public
school superintendents, announced that his organization would “continue to oppose any
proposed law and/or referendum that would direct public tax funds to religious and other
private K-12 schools.”51
Most commentators agreed that the next major battleground over vouchers would
be the state courts, particularly courts in jurisdictions with state constitutional provisions
that are more stringent than the federal Establishment Clause in banning public aid to
religious schools.52 There are approximately thirty states with stringent anti-aid
provisions in their constitutions.53 These constitutional provisions are collectively
referred to as “Blaine amendments.” 54
Blaine Amendments: “repellant residues of 19th Century nativism”55
James G. Blaine served as a Republican leader of the U.S. House of
Representatives during the Grant administration.56 In 1875, Blaine sought to insert an
amendment into the U.S. Constitution prohibiting public funds from coming “under the
control of any religious sect.”57 This effort, as scholars have shown, was motivated by
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Blaine’s desire to capitalize on a wave of anti-Catholic feelings that swept through the
United States in the years following the Civil War.58
Although Blaine’s proposed amendment narrowly failed, similar provisions were
added to many state constitutions; and several western territories were required to insert a
Blaine-type amendment into their proposed state constitutions as a condition of achieving
statehood.59 By 1890, twenty-nine states had adopted constitutional provisions barring
public aid to religious schools.60
Voucher advocates argue that the Blaine amendments are—to use columnist
George Will’s description—“repellant residues of 19th century nativism”61--and should be
declared unconstitutional.62 Voucher opponents—backed by the teachers unions and
public education’s most powerful professional organizations—retort that the history of
the state-level Blaine amendments is nuanced and not rooted in religious prejudice.63
They also contend that the Blaine Amendments uphold the states’ legitimate interest in
prohibiting public funds from going to sectarian institutions.
In Mitchell v. Helms,64 Justice Thomas, who wrote the plurality opinion, stated
clearly that hostility to aid to religious schools, such as that expressed in Blaine’s
amendment and the many state-level Blaine Amendments, had a “shameful pedigree”65
that was rooted in anti-Catholic prejudice.
Opposition to aid to “sectarian” schools acquired prominence in the 1870s
with Congress’s consideration (and near passage) of the Blaine
Amendment, which would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid
to sectarian institutions. Consideration of the amendment arose at a time
of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general,
and it was an open secret that “sectarian” was code for “Catholic.”66
Thomas concluded that “nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the
exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs, and
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other doctrines of this Court bar it. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried
now.”67
Many scholars concur with Justice Thomas’s assessment, agreeing that antipathy
toward Catholicism was a major factor in the adoption of these constitutional
amendments.68 Toby Heytens summarizes the scholarly consensus on this point:
[T]he conclusion that [the Blaine Amendments] were driven by the
Protestant/Catholic divide is unmistakable, despite the fact that none of the
amendments refer specifically to Roman Catholics or Catholic Schools.
This appears to be the scholarly consensus. It is also supported by the
statistics regarding private school religious affiliation at the time, the
Senate debate over the Federal Blaine Amendment, and the breakdown of
social and political groups that supported and opposed the measure.69
And Paul Viteritti, perhaps the foremost scholar regarding the Blaine Amendments,
summarized them as follows: “Taken as a whole, these measures reflect the confluence
of political forces that erupted when strong nativist sentiment was joined with the
common-school movement at the turn of the century to stem the growth of religious
schools and their support with state funds.”70

Bush v. Holmes: Florida Voucher Program Invalidated by State Blaine Amendment
In spite of their odious history, the Blaine Amendments—with their overt
hostility toward public funding for sectarian schools—provided a perfect vehicle
for voucher opponents to challenge legislated voucher programs. 71 In fact, even
prior to Zelman, voucher opponents had relied on Blaine Amendments to stop the
Milwaukee and Cleveland voucher programs. In both cases, however, those
efforts were unsuccessful; and the programs were upheld in the state courts.72
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In a Florida case, however, filed before the Zelman decision and still ongoing,
voucher opponents were more successful. Indeed, in Bush v. Holmes, decided only six
weeks after the Zelman decision was issued, a Florida trial court invalidated the Florida
voucher program under Florida’s Blaine Amendment.73 In August 2004, the trial court’s
decision was upheld by a Florida intermediate appellate court.74
Florida’s voucher program was adopted into law by the Florida legislature in
1999.75 Like the Cleveland voucher program, the Florida program permitted children in
failing public schools to use state-funded vouchers to attend private schools—both
secular and religious.
In the summer of 1999, the Florida Education Association, the Florida branch of
the American Federation of Teachers, the Florida PTA, and other anti-voucher groups
filed lawsuits seeking to have the program declared unconstitutional under the Florida
and U.S. constitutions.76 In March 2000, a Florida trial judge invalidated the program on
the grounds that it violated the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of an adequate system of
public schools.77 But in October 2000, a Florida appellate court reversed the trial court’s
decision and remanded the case back to the trial court level for a determination as to
alternative constitutional arguments, including whether the voucher program violated
Florida’s Blaine Amendment.78
Then in August 2002, only six weeks after the Supreme Court’s Zelman decision,
a Florida trial judge struck down the program on the grounds that it violated Article I,
Section 3 of the Florida Constitution—Florida’s Blaine Amendment.79 Within 48 hours
after the decision was released, National School Board Association, the American
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Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association, and the National PTA issued
statements praising the Florida judge’s decision.80
The State of Florida appealed this decision, but in November 2004, the full
Florida appellate court, upheld the trial court in an 8-5-1 opinion .81 The appellate court
concluded that Florida’s “no-aid provision” is more restrictive than the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.82 Thus, even if the
Florida voucher program is constitutional under the Establishment Clause as it was
interpreted in Zelman, it falls afoul of the Florida Constitution’s ban against using public
money to aid sectarian institutions.83 Moreover, since the Florida Constitution forbids
both direct and indirect aid, the fact that vouchers went to parents and not to sectarian
institutions themselves did not render the voucher program constitutional.84
Furthermore, the Florida appellate court rejected any argument that Florida’s
Blaine Amendment was adopted in a spirit of anti-Catholic prejudice, concluding that
“there is no evidence of religious bigotry in Florida’s no-aid provision.” 85 Nevertheless,
the court added, “Even if the no-aid provisions were “born of bigotry,” such a history
does not render the final sentence of Article I, section 3 [Florida’s no-aid provision]
superfluous.”86
Now that the full First District Court of Appeal has ruled, Bush v. Holmes will
undoubtedly be appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.87 In its current posture, Bush v.
Holmes is discouraging for voucher proponents, because the Blaine Amendment utilized
to invalidate Florida’s voucher program is but one of about thirty such amendments
embedded in state constitutions across the United States.
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Locke v. Davey: Supreme Court Leaves Washington’s “Blaine Amendment” in Place
Bush v. Holmes dramatically illustrated the power of the Blaine Amendments to
derail voucher programs like the one upheld in Zelman. Obviously, a broad ruling by the
Supreme Court invalidating a state’s Blaine Amendment on federal constitutional
grounds would go a long way toward reducing the use of these provisions as an antivoucher strategy. And in Locke v. Davey,88 voucher advocates thought they saw an
opportunity for the Court to do exactly that.89 Unfortunately, from the voucher advocates’
perspective, the Supreme Court declined to take this opportunity.
In Locke v. Davey, Joshua Davey received a publicly-funded Washington Promise
Scholarship, which he could use to offset the cost of his postsecondary education.90
Davey wished to use his scholarship to help pay expenses at Northwest College, a
sectarian institution affiliated with the Assemblies of God denomination, where he
planned to pursue a degree in devotional theology.91 However, Davey learned that
Washington state law prohibited him from using his scholarship to pursue a degree in
theology.92
Davey sued Washington state officials, arguing that the state statute that
prohibited him from using his scholarship for theological study violated the
Establishment Clause, Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.93
He also argued that the statutory prohibition violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.94

A federal trial court rejected Davey’s constitutional claims

and awarded summary judgment in favor of the State of Washington.95
On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court.96 The
appellate court made three findings: that the State had singled out religion for
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unfavorable treatment, that the State’s antiestablishment concerns were not compelling,
and that a ban on the use of Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program for religious
study was unconstitutional.97
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected the State of Washington’s
argument that a ban on scholarship funding for theological study was justified under the
State’s constitutional prohibition against using public funds to aid religious schools. In
the Ninth Circuit’s view, “once the State of Washington decided to provide Promise
Scholarships to all students who meet objective criteria, it had to make the financial
benefit available on a viewpoint neutral basis.”98
The Ninth Circuit decision in Davey v. Locke did not take the history of
Washington’s constitutional prohibitions against public aid for religious schools into
account when reaching its decision; nor did it label those provisions as Blaine
Amendments. In other words, the Ninth Circuit did not attach any bigoted motivation to
the passage of these provisions. Robert William Gall, a staff attorney for the Institute of
Justice, wrote that identifying Washington’s constitutional provision with its real interest
of anti-Catholic discrimination, would have “forced a head-on confrontation with
Blaine’s legacy.” 99 Such a confrontation, Gall believed, “would produce a blanket
condemnation of all states’ religion clauses that can be linked to that [anti-Catholic]
legacy.”100
Nevertheless, voucher advocates took heart from the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
And when the United Supreme Court agreed to review the case, both sides of the voucher
issue realized that the Court’s decision could have a major impact on whether voucher
programs would survive against legal challenges brought under various other Blaine
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Amendments. If the Supreme Court clearly denounced Washington’s Blaine
Amendments as being rooted in bigotry and declared such provisions to be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, then state-level
challenges to voucher programs would be effectively cleared away.
After all, as discussed above, a plurality of the Supreme Court had taken explicit
notice of the anti-Catholic bigotry that had fueled the proposed federal Blaine
Amendment. 101 In Mitchell v. Helms, the plurality opinion stated plainly that hostility to
aid religious schools had “a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow . . .”102
Unfortunately, from the perspective of voucher advocates, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Locke v. Davey was disappointing. In a 7 to 2 decision, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.103 The Court concluded that the State of
Washington had a substantial interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees.104
Moreover, the Court ruled, the State need not fund training for religious degrees simply
because it provided scholarship funding for secular studies.105
Perhaps most importantly, the Court declined to declare that Washington’s
constitutional anti-aid provision was rooted in hostility towards the Catholic religion.
[W]e find neither in the history or text of Article I, Section 11 of the
Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship
Program, anything that suggests animus toward religion. Given the
historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot
conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction is
inherently constitutionally suspect.106
Indeed, the Court went further when and stated that that Washington’s
constitution does not contain a Blaine Amendment.
The amici contend that Washington’s Constitution was born of
religious bigotry because it contains a so-called “Blaine
Amendment,” which has been linked with anti-Catholicism. As the
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State notes and Davey does not dispute, however, the provision in
question is not a Blaine Amendment. . . . Neither Davey nor amici
have established a credible connection between the Blaine
Amendment and Article I, §11, the relevant constitutional
provision. Accordingly, the Blaine Amendment’s history is not
before us.107
Naturally, voucher opponents were delighted with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Locke v. Davey. The American Federation of Teachers, which had joined in filing an
amicus brief in the case, clearly understood the significance of the ruling. “Had we not
won this case,” an AFT attorney said, “our battle against vouchers in the state courts
would have been dealt a significant setback.”108
Wirzburger v. Galvin:109 First Circuit Considers Massachusetts’s Anti-Aid Provision
Taken together, Bush v. Holmes and Locke v. Davey demonstrate that no-aid
provisions in state constitutions, whether or not they are labeled as Blaine Amendments,
are powerful barriers to the implementation of voucher programs like the one upheld in
Zelman. A federal case, however, currently before the First Circuit, has the potential for
weakening the power of a Blaine-style constitutional amendment in the Massachusetts
Constitution to stop voucher programs from being implemented in the Bay State.
Wirzburger v. Galvin,110 as the case is titled at the appellate level, is particularly
intriguing, because the evidence is overwhelming that the state constitutional provision
that is at the heart of that court case was approved by Massachusetts legislators in the
spirit of rampant anti-Catholic bigotry that prevailed in the state in the mid-19th century.
Plaintiffs in the case, parents whose children attended Catholic schools, sought to
utilize the initiative provision in the Massachusetts Constitution to amend Article 18 of
the Massachusetts Constitution (referred to by the court as the “Anti-Aid
Amendment”),111 which prohibits public money from aiding, either directly or indirectly,
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any religious elementary or secondary school.112 Plaintiffs or their supporters had
obtained sufficient signatures on a citizen initiative petition (more than 80,000) to put the
question of amending the Article 18 on the ballot.113 However, state officials refused to
put the matter to a vote on the grounds that the Massachusetts Constitution prohibited the
Anti-Aid Amendment or any constitutional provision pertaining to religion from being
amended or repealed through a voter initiative.114
Specifically Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution, adopted at the State’s
1917-1918 Constitutional Convention, established an initiative process whereby citizens,
by collecting sufficient signatures, could put legislative proposals to a popular vote.
However, before Article 48 was finally adopted, two amendments were inserted. One
amendment (called the “Anti-Aid Exclusion”) prohibited the use of the voter initiative
process to modify the Anti-Aid Amendment, the 1855 constitutional prohibition against
public aid for sectarian schools, which the 1917-1918 delegates had already amended and
strengthened. In addition, delegates inserted the so-called “Religious Exclusion”
amendment into Amendment 48, forbidding the use of the initiative process to introduce
any matter pertaining to religion.
In their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs presented historical evidence
showing that the Massachusetts anti-aid provision, which was adopted by state voters in
1855, had first been approved by the Massachusetts legislature when it was
overwhelmingly dominated by the anti-Catholic Know Nothing Party. Specifically, the
plaintiffs provided the court with the affidavit of John R. Mulkern, a professor at Babson
College and author of The Know-Nothing Party of Massachusetts: The Rise and Fall of a
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People’s Movement.115 The affidavit describes the blatant anti-Catholicism of
Massachusetts state government in the mid-1850s.
In his affidavit, Mulkern stated that the Know-Nothing Party of the 1850s “had its
roots in the anti-Catholic, anti-foreign Native American movement of the 1840s.”116 The
party derived its name from the fact that “its members were sworn to deny knowing
anything about its existence,”117 and the party reflected a broad-based hostility toward the
Irish that existed in Massachusetts at that time.118
In 1854, Mulkern explained, the Know-Nothing Party of Massachusetts swept
into power in a landslide election. “Every constitutional state officer, the entire
congressional delegation, all forty state senators, and all but 3 of the 379 representatives
[of the state legislature] bore the Know-Nothing stamp.”119 In addition, a Know-Nothing
candidate won the Massachusetts governor’s office with a 63 percent majority of the
vote, carrying all but twenty of the state’s more than 300 towns.120
Citing from his book, Mulkern described the anti-Catholic activities of this
outrageously bigoted political party. Working together, the Governor and legislature
passed legislation mandating “a daily reading of the King James Bible in the public
schools (which was offensive to Catholics),”121 dismissing Irish state workers, banning
the teaching of foreign languages in the public schools, and limiting public office to
native-born citizens. In addition, the legislature approved a proposed constitutional
amendment to bar Roman Catholics from holding public office.122
In 1854, the Know-Nothing dominated legislature overwhelmingly approved a
constitutional amendment prohibiting the use of any public money for the benefit of any
religious school. The provision was submitted to Massachusetts voters, who passed it by
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a comfortable margin in 1855.123 This provision became Article XVIII of the
Massachusetts Constitution; and, according to Mulkern, “was based on nativist and antiCatholic bias and intended to preserve native-born Protestant dominance.”124
In addition to the expert testimony of Dr. Mulkern, the Wirzburger plaintiffs
submitted the affidavit of Dr. Charles Glenn, a professor at Boston University and author
of The Myth of the Common School. Glen explained that anti-Catholic sentiment was a
major factor in the development of the common schools in Massachusetts in the mid1850s.125 A major goal of these schools, as Glen discussed more fully in his book, was to
assimilate Catholic school children into American Protestant culture.126
In fact, the Boston School Committee made this goal explicit in an 1850
document that stressed the assimilation agenda of the Protestant-dominated school
authorities:
We must open the doors of our school houses and invite and compel them
to come in. There is no other hope for them or for us . . . In our Schools
they receive moral and religious teaching, powerful enough if possible to
keep them in the right path amid the moral darkness which is their daily
and domestic walk . . . . unless we can redeem this population in their
childhood by moral means, we must control them by force, or support
them as paupers at a maturer period of life.127
Thus, the Boston School Committee made daily Bible reading a mandatory part of
the school day in 1851; and the Know-Nothing-dominated state legislature adopted a law
to that effect in 1855.128 Catholics found this practice offensive, since school authorities
used the King James Bible for these daily exercises and not the Catholic approved Douay
Bible.
An incident referred to as the “Eliot School Rebellion”129 illustrates the Protestant
dominance of public education in Boston during the 1850s. In March 1859, a teacher at
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Boston’s Eliot School ordered Thomas Whall, a Catholic school boy, to read the Ten
Commandments from the King James Bible.130 Whall refused, having been admonished
by his father not to do so. An assistant to the school principal then stepped into the
classroom and informed the class, “Here’s a boy that refuses to repeat the Ten
Commandments, and I will whip him till he yields if it takes the whole forenoon.”131
The administrator then beat Whall severely with a rattan stick for half an hour.132
At the conclusion of this beating, the Eliot School principal ordered all boys not
willing to read from the King James version of the Bible to leave the school, and about
100 Catholic schoolboys were discharged.133 The following day, three hundred Catholic
school boys were discharged from school for the same offense.134
This then was the environment in which the voters of Massachusetts adopted a
constitutional amendment baring any public aid to sectarian schools, and it is this 1855
constitutional amendment that the Wirzburger plaintiffs had sought to amend through a
voters’ initiative. However, as previously discussed, delegates at the 1917-1918
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention foresaw this possibility more than eighty years
ago and approved another constitutional provision that prohibits any initiative petition to
repeal the Anti-Aid Amendment or any other initiative petition that concerned “religion,
religious practices, or religious institutions.”135 This provision was approved by
Massachusetts voters and became Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution.
Plaintiffs submitted historical evidence to show that the 1917 Anti-Aid Exclusion
and the Religious Exclusion were also adopted during a period of anti-Catholic prejudice
in Massachusetts,136 and they asked the court to order the State of Massachusetts to
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process their initiative petition and put the amendment of the state’s constitutional antiaid provision to a vote.137
Unfortunately, the federal district court was not persuaded. In a March 2004
opinion, a federal judge issued a declaratory judgment stating that Amendment Article 48
of the Massachusetts Constitution is not “invalid as violative of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution” and entered judgment against the
plaintiffs. 138 In the trial court’s view, the constitutional limitation on the use of voter
initiatives represented a consensus among the 1917 constitutional convention delegates
that the voter initiative process for passing legislation should not be available without
limitation. 139
These exclusions reflect an evident judgment that some questions are
better resolved in a process that permits extended debate and compromise
than in a process that essentially puts a fixed proposition to the general
electorate for a single up or down vote. The wisdom and prudence of the
exclusions are a matter on which opinion could reasonably be divided, but
it cannot be said that insisting that certain subjects are better addressed in
the traditional way of representative government before they are put on the
state-wide ballot is an irrational idea.140
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the First Circuit, and briefs were
filed in the summer of 2004.141 In an amici curiae brief, Massachusetts’s two largest
teachers unions (joined by several other anti-voucher groups) argued that the current
version of the 1855 anti-aid amendment cannot be construed as anti-Catholic because it
was wholly rewritten in two subsequent state constitutional conventions in which
Catholic legislators participated.142 And it is true that the current version of the KnowNothing Party’s original handiwork differs somewhat from the original.143 Nevertheless,
the central theme of bigotry still resides in the Massachusetts anti-aid provision, and this
“shameful pedigree,”144 to use Justice Thomas’s words, helped shape the jurisprudence
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and political climate that has been hostile to sectarian education in the United States for
150 years.
Wirzburger v. Galvin is probably the most important case since Zelman with
regard to the future of vouchers because the evidence of anti-Catholic bigotry
surrounding the passage of the 1855 Massachusetts anti-aid amendment is quite strong—
stronger than any evidence that has been presented so far in other Blaine Amendment
challenges. If the First Circuit reverses the federal trial court’s decision and allows voters
the option of amending or repealing the Massachusetts anti-aid provision, its decision
will hearten voucher advocates in other states whose goals are blocked by Blaine
Amendments.
If the First Circuit’s opinion in Wirzburger upholds the district court’s opinion,
thereby prohibiting Massachusetts voters from amending or repealing their state’s bigoted
constitutional ban against aid to sectarian schools, the Supreme Court may well grant
certiorari and review the case. Given the Court’s strong condemnation of Blaine
Amendments in the Mitchell v. Helms plurality opinion, it is hard to imagine the Supreme
Court passing up an opportunity to address the Bay State’s disgraceful constitutional
heritage that the Wirzburger plaintiffs unmasked.
Conclusion
As the Supreme Court acknowledged more than thirty-five years ago, “private
education has played and is playing a significant and valuable role in raising national
levels of knowledge, competence, and experience.”145 The Court noted that millions of
children have been educated in private schools—including parochial schools—and the
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fact that so many parents send their children to them is a strong indication that “those
schools do an acceptable job of providing secular education to their students.”146
Today, as the Supreme Court recognized so articulately with regard to the
children of Cleveland, Ohio,147 impoverished inner-city school children are not receiving
an adequate education in many public schools. Clearly they deserve an alternative to
dysfunctional urban school systems like the one in Cleveland.
In Zelman, the Supreme Court offered a ray of hope to inner-city families trapped
in dysfunctional school systems. By allowing low-income Cleveland school children to
use vouchers to pursue other educational options—including religious schools—the
Supreme Court provided impoverished, inner-city school children an alternative to the
“indisputably failed” 148 Cleveland public school system.
After Zelman, voucher opponents focused their attacks in the state courts, where
state Blaine Amendments or other state constitutional provisions have the power to
nullify Zelman’s significance. In Bush v. Holmes, 149 anti-voucher forces won a
significant post-Zelman victory when a Florida appellate court invalidated a Florida
voucher program under the state’s Blaine Amendment. And in February 2004, the
Supreme Court declined to nullify a Washington constitutional provision that some had
labeled as a Blaine Amendment, finding no evidence of anti-Catholic animus in
Washington’s constitutional anti-aid provision.150 Unless the Supreme Court issues an
overarching decision that eliminates or at least undermines various state constitutional
challenges to legislated voucher programs, voucher opponents may soon render Zelman
almost irrelevant.
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Wirzburger v. Galvin, now pending before the First Circuit, is the next important
case in the ongoing battle between voucher advocates and their opponents. If the case
gets to the Supreme Court, the Justices will have the chance to invalidate a bigoted state
constitutional provision that effectively nullifies Zelman’s ruling in the State of
Massachusetts. In the spirit of Zelman, the Court should take this opportunity and clear
away another legal obstacle to the goal the Supreme Court so clearly hoped to achieve
when it rendered its historic decision in 2002—expanding the opportunities for American
children to attend decent schools.
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which is not publicly owned and under the exclusive control, order and superintendence
of public officers or public agents authorized by the commonwealth or federal authority
or both, except that appropriations may be made for the maintenance and support of the
Soldiers' Home in Massachusetts and for free public libraries in any city or town, and to
carry out legal obligations, if any, already entered into; and no such grant, appropriation
or use of public money or property or loan of public credit shall be made or authorized
for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any church, religious denomination or
society.
Article 18, §2 of the present Massachusetts Constitution states:
No grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of credit shall be
made or authorized by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the
purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any infirmary, hospital, institution, primary or
secondary school, or charitable or religious undertaking which is not publicly owned and
under the exclusive control, order and supervision of public officers or public agents
authorized by the Commonwealth or federal authority or both, except that appropriations
may be made for the maintenance and support of the Soldiers' Home in Massachusetts
and for free public libraries in any city or town and to carry out legal obligations, if any,
already entered into; and no such grant, appropriation or use of public money or property
or loan of public credit shall be made or authorized for the purpose of founding,
maintaining or aiding any church, religious denomination or society. Nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent the Commonwealth from making grants-in-aid to
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private higher educational institution or to students or parents or guardians of students
attending such institutions.
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